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	<title>Comments on: Are You Prepared for Certificate Authority Breaches?</title>
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	<link>http://labs.neohapsis.com/2012/07/16/are-you-prepared-for-certificate-authority-breaches/</link>
	<description>Managing Risk and Security since 1998</description>
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		<title>By: Walter goulet</title>
		<link>http://labs.neohapsis.com/2012/07/16/are-you-prepared-for-certificate-authority-breaches/#comment-2565</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Walter goulet]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Jul 2012 01:53:20 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[(Disclaimer: I work for a company that manages a widely trusted CA root.)

Good article; glad to see that the security of external CAs is brought up as a risk factor for organizations. 

One point that struck me while reading this post is that it doesn&#039;t quite explain how a CA breach could really affect an organization. While it is certainly true that there are many different CA trust stores built into software/devices, a breach of one of the trusted CAs doesn&#039;t necessarily mean &#039;game over&#039; for an organization. It all depends on exactly how the devices use certificates and what services they provide.

For example, organizations that rely heavily on certificates issued by a compromised public CA for securing externally facing websites would definitely be impacted and would likely need to scramble to replace those certificates. Organizations that use code signing certificates issued by a compromised public CA would also be greatly impacted.

In other cases, the risks are a little harder to understand, such as the load balancer example you mentioned above.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>(Disclaimer: I work for a company that manages a widely trusted CA root.)</p>
<p>Good article; glad to see that the security of external CAs is brought up as a risk factor for organizations. </p>
<p>One point that struck me while reading this post is that it doesn&#8217;t quite explain how a CA breach could really affect an organization. While it is certainly true that there are many different CA trust stores built into software/devices, a breach of one of the trusted CAs doesn&#8217;t necessarily mean &#8216;game over&#8217; for an organization. It all depends on exactly how the devices use certificates and what services they provide.</p>
<p>For example, organizations that rely heavily on certificates issued by a compromised public CA for securing externally facing websites would definitely be impacted and would likely need to scramble to replace those certificates. Organizations that use code signing certificates issued by a compromised public CA would also be greatly impacted.</p>
<p>In other cases, the risks are a little harder to understand, such as the load balancer example you mentioned above.</p>
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